BACKGROUND: Air transportation of personnel to offshore oil platforms is one of the major hazards of this kind of endeavor. Pilot performance is a key factor in the safety of the transportation system. O BJECTIVE: This study seeks to identify the ergonomic factors present in pilots' activities that may in some way compromise or enhance their performance, the constraints and affordances which they are subject to; and where possible to link these to their associated risk factors METHODS: Methodology adopted in this project studies work in its context. It is a merging of Activity Analysis (Guerin et al. 2001) of European tradition with Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA -www.ctaresource.com) articulated with the recent approaches to cognitive systems engineering developed by Professors David Woods and Erik Hollnagel. Fifty-five hours of field interviews provided the input for analysis. RESULTS: Sixteen ergonomic constraints were identified, some cognitive, some physical, all considered relevant by the research subjects and expert advisers CONCLUSIONS: Although the safety record of the personnel transportation system studied is considered acceptable, there is low hanging fruit to be picked which can help improve the system's safety.
Introduction
The notion that accidents and incidents are caused by hum an errors or m echanical failures is w idespread. It still guides m uch o f w hat is done in the safety do main, but we m ust recognize that in com plex system s, conditions may em erge w here certain outcom es com e to be beyond the reach o f operators' actions [1] , C om ing to grips with the idea that accidents can be prim ed by com plex socio-technical system s designed or oper ating inadequately relative to the capabilities o f their hum an operators, especially in regard to aspects o f their cognition, is an im portant first step in building re silient and safe system s [2, 3] .
This study seeks to identify instances w here, in their eyes, helicopter p ilo ts' w ork taxes them unduly or un necessarily, w orking from the prem ise that ergonom ic aspects o f critical w ork can have an im pact on the safety o f that work. T his research uses a cognitive en gineering [4] fram ew ork to study the operational con ditions in w hich pilots carry out their w ork and to as sess them ergonom ically.
A bout 80% o f the oil extracted in B razil com es from this Basin, located a 3 hour drive north o f Rio de Janeiro city, and approxim ately 400 pilots and co-pilots working for 9 helicopter companies transport about 40,000 people who work on ships and plat forms every month, in 6,300 helicopter flights. These large numbers provide the motivation for the research project of which the ergonomic component of pilots' activities is reported here. The main goal of the project is to analyze and discover how the transportation sys tem is resilient and brittle given the workload demands and economic pressures. The ergonomic analysis un covered factors that impose demands upon the pilots' and some of their strategies for coping with them.
Flying helicopters in the personnel transportation service for the offshore oil and gas exploration and pro duction operations in the Campos Basin is a demand ing activity associated with one of the major hazards of this kind of endeavor. In the Campos Basin, the off shore platforms are located about 100 km from the coast, and this transport has resulted in several acci dents. These accidents were related to helideck opera tions and helicopter failure during flight.
This research uses ergonomic methods to examine constraints associated with pilot's work in the heli copter transportation system for the Campos Basin oil fields in Brazil. The study team carried out and ana lyzed 55 hours of interviews with aviators (pilots, co pilots, and managers) of some of the main helicopter companies. The initial objective of the research pro gram was to map the constraints to which air-crew are subjected in the course of their daily activities. Constraints are factors that in some way hamper what is done or how things are done, and are the object of various coping strategies. As a general rule these factors can contribute to undesirable system occur rences, generating micro incidents [5] , but they are in sufficient, in isolation, to provoke incidents or acci dents [6] . Nonetheless, the aggregate load and/or wear and tear generated by the accumulation of many small constraints under the faster, better, cheaper organiza tional environment can impact system performance and safety [7] , and be the cause of great losses. One of the fronts for progress on safety therefore depends on providing conditions which mitigate these constraints, including identifying the safety/production tradeoffs made by people during their daily work [8] ,
Methods
Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) based on field stud ies is the natural methodological framework for this study. CTA is a ubiquitous description for a number of methods used to elicit knowledge from professionals in specific domains. According to Crandall et al. [9] CTA is a set of methods to study and describe reasoning and knowledge in context. These studies include the oper ators' activities of perceiving and attending that under lie performance of tasks, the cognitive skills and strate gies needed to deal with complex situations, as well as the purposes, goals, and motivations for cognitive work [9] .
Among these methods, we adopted the Ergonomic Work Analysis (EWA), an approach used by the French ergonomics school (e.g. De Keyser and Nyssen [10] ), based on activity theory (Engenstron [11] ), in which the subjects are observed/intervie-wed in their actual work setting.
This qualitative ethnographic framework implies that the researcher collect empirical data while inter acting with people under study. The observation/interviewing in situ implies the daily taking of field notes (supported by electronic media -audio and video recording) that record naturally occurring talks and in teractions between observed actors. Particularly, we want to stress that this method of field observation is especially suitable for study of work organization is sues, enabling access to the backstage activities where workers hold the tacit competencies that make possi ble all the cooperative strategies essential to the ac complishment of daily work. This strategy of gathering data allows grasping the vivid social scenes with ac companying conflicts, misunderstandings, processes of negotiation among actors, creations of consensual ar rangements to disrespect prescriptive rules ... that of ten come together with jargons, gestures, jokes, and so forth.
Finally, ethnographic research assumes that there is no independence between the collection of empirical and all the interactions that occur between the field ob server and the insiders. This is to say that all these in teractions, occurring between the researcher and peo ple under study, have to be considered as empirical data that will be classified as part of the theoretical analysis.
Research setting: Campos Basin oil and gas exploration
The sedimentary area known as Campos Basin cov ers an area of around 60,000 square miles on the north ern coast of Rio de Janeiro state. On shore, the bound aries of the basin are outlined by the hills surrounding it. More than a thousand oil and gas wells, 38 fixed and mobile production platforms, over 2,500 miles of submarine pipelines, production of more than a million barrels of oil and 15.7 million cubic meters of gas per day, which is around 80% and 42% of the national pro duction, respectively, operate in dozens of oil fields. With most of the fields 100 kilometers or more from shore, the production platforms have been designed as self-contained units with their own power supplies and accommodation for staff and the helicopter trans portation system has become the only option available, mainly due to the lower transportation time when com paring to the older catamaran transportation system.
To explore different kinds of oil and gas fields and for different types of exploration and production ac tivities there are many different platform types, re quiring different helicopter landing approaches. The main types of platform used are fixed platforms, jack up platforms, semi-submersible platforms, drill ships, and Floating production, storage and offloading vessels (FPSO) platforms.
Sample characterization
The sample we studied was defined by combination of opportunity and intent: opportunity since we could only interview volunteer pilots who were on duty but not flying, a routine and fairly common situation which arises from aircraft unavailability; intent as from the available pilots we could have made choices seeking to maintain a balance of company roles among the partic ipants in our study. It turned out that the pilot mix and numbers available closely matched our planned sample profile and size, and all comers were interviewed.
Although for the full study other categories were interviewed, only the aviator category and its sub categories are reported on here due to our focus on er gonomics in this paper. The category descriptions are presented below:
Aviators: Everyone licensed to fly helicopters, in cluding pilots, co-pilots, and operating company managers whose job descriptions required them to hold a valid pilot's license (pilots + co-pilots); Pilots: Everyone licensed to command a helicopter and cleared to do so by their companies, and who occupy helicopter operating company pilot or avi ator management positions; Pilots/non-management: Pilots charged only with flying and commanding helicopters, with no man agement or statutory responsibilities beyond their aircraft; Pilots/management: Pilots with management or statutory responsibilities within a helicopter oper ating company (equipment chief, flight coordina tor, etc.); Co-pilots: Licensed helicopter pilots assigned to the co-pilot role by the companies due factors such as not having met the company's time with the company requirement, the contractor's time in the basin requirement, or lack of available pilot posi tions in the company. It is not unusual for a co-pilot to be more experienced and/or qualified than fellow pilots.
Breakdowns of the category sizes in the research set ting and in the research sample, and allocated research efforts are presented below.
The interview times presented reflect the research effort dedicated to each role. That there is difference between interview times to interviewee times is due to the fact that some sessions interviewed more than one participant simultaneously. This difference is adjusted for in the interviewee count considered when calculat ing the mean interview durations. The data reflect the fact that the co-pilots were more forthcoming and ea ger to participate and as a rule made more time avail able than the pilots, and that among the pilots, the ones holding management positions did likewise relative to those only flying.
Data collection
2.3.1. Getting situated: Regulatory structure o f the activity To prepare for their data collection interviews with operators, presented in more detail below, the research group familiarized itself with their activity's regulatory structure, through interviews with two Commanders, both flight safety consultants. In addition to other in formation, the flight safety consultants listed the offi cial bodies with regulatory authority over the activity, the set of rules, regulations, and laws that govern the activity, and briefly presented the contractual relation ships between the service users and the helicopter op erating companies, and between these and the aviators. The network of governing bodies, companies, rules, and regulations that establish the framework in which pilot's activities are carried out was mapped out by the research team and the resultant diagram validated by the consultants.
Field work: Helicopter operators report on
their activity Once the relevant parts (for purposes of this study) of the Regulations had been studied, the group set out to establish contact with aviators engaged in the Cam pos Basin passenger transportation helicopter flying activity using cognitive task analysis techniques [9] . Field data collection was mainly conducted through extensive interviews with operators (active pilots and co-pilots) that were recorded, and the recordings were later transcribed. Due to the aircrafts' restricted cabin space and cargo capacity, and to the lack of contractor's consent, the team had no opportunity to make direct in flight observations of airmen's activities. In addition to aviators, other participants in the air transport system that interact with them were interviewed at the same or lesser depth. All participants were volunteers.
During the interviews, the interviewers took notes of the issues raised by the interviewees, and immedi ately afterwards took the time to discuss the content of the interview among themselves, and to write their hot-reports. In the exceptional cases where respondents preferred that their interviews, or parts thereof, not be recorded, more detailed notes than usual were made.
The starting point was the search for detailed under standing of pilots' activities and routine work. To do so, semi-structured interviews were conducted with pi lots, co-pilots, and other helicopter operator company personnel over two three month periods a year apart. With few exceptions, meetings were held at the Macae Airport in Macae, RJ. The interviews were conducted in an informal and relaxed tone, intended leave pi lots at ease and to promote frank disclosure. With par ticipants' permission, the conversations were recorded and later transcribed for a better use of the information. Several short intervals were left unrecorded by request.
Recurring issues became apparent within the first in terviews. To validate these and other issues that were mentioned, we used other interviews, followed up with further reading, and also conferred with domain ex perts.
As the study progressed several things changed. The structure of the interviews evolved over the period of field studies. In every interview there was an initial pe riod to break the ice, for questions and answers about the research, its motivation, methods, goals, and pa trons, and to discuss topics such as confidentiality of the interviews and traceability of sources. In the early interviews, the initial period was followed by a pe riod of free interaction, to a large degree conducted by the interviewees for an audience of attentive listeners (us analysts). In the later interviews, the initial period was followed by a period of structured open questions raised by the interviewers and another dedicated to the review (validation) of interim findings through joint discussion of draft activity diagrams and the list of con straints presented by the research team. Even during the more structured parts of the interviews, researchers remained alert and ready to allow the necessary oppor tunities for new topics to emerge. After discussing the activity diagrams and constraints list, there was an in formal and unstructured short break for rapport, saying thank yous, and goodbyes.
The interviews were conducted many to many, many to one, one to many and one to one, as dictated by circumstances and/or by interviewee wishes. We noted interesting differences in the dynamics of the different types of interview and questioned their impact on the methodological validity of the elicited data. We con cluded that these differences within the study sample and in the context of a more qualitative than quantita-tive study, were not relevant in the scope of this project, and did not compromise the data.
We believe these differences could in and of them selves be an interesting element of study. It remains to be determined whether the memory and verbalization stimuli provided by the more 'conversation' than 'in terview' format and the counterpoint of withdrawl and competition due to the presence of others have a net positive or negative effect.
Rather than focusing on how work should be done (the prescribed rules and tasks), we aim to understand how the work is being done and why it is being done in that particular way. This approach recognizes the vari ability of the workers' activities and that their optionswhat, when and how to do some action -are afforded and constrained by the work environment. To reconcile the affordances and constraints of the work environ ment with their own capabilities and limitations, work ers can generate a large variety of work patterns in cluding novel behaviors and innovations in work prac tices, which must be monitored to identify production/ safety implications. Although there are different types of constraints rooted at various levels within the orga nization and the overall system that can shape work ers' behavior, allowing for several dimensions of anal ysis, the results reported here focus on the constraints and conditions of pilots' work activities in the con text of their companies' sociotechnical conditions as determined by their investments, maintenance, etc., and their management of human resources, including salary and work rules, as determined by their social policies, work organization procedures, training, etc.
To accommodate characteristics of the pilots' work activities, interview methods were used, avoiding the logistical complications that direct observation of pi lots' work activities would entail. The subjects (heli copter pilots and co-pilots and people in different orga nizational roles) were systematically interviewed. In terviews were recorded with their consent and tran scribed to facilitate data analysis. The entire research was done with the support of expert consultants in off shore aviation operations. The final results were vali dated with pilots, companies, and with the service con tractor (the oil company) staff.
Results
The data collected in the field lend themselves to dif ferent types of analysis and objectives, and we expect that uses will be found for them beyond the scope of this work. In a previous article [10] our focus was the pilots' sacrifice decisions to take off or not when con fronted with flaws in the equipment. In this article we describe the main constraints which pilots flying heli copters transporting passengers offshore in the Cam pos Basin are subject to, mentioned most frequently by respondents.
A map o f the constraints to pilots' activities
Throughout the pilot interview process there were a number of recurring issues. These issues began to emerge as being vital to proper system operation and we identified them as indicators of where to focus our analysis. These are constraints (see Fig. 1 ), factors that tax operators' performance and can contribute to un desirable occurrences within the system. In general, an isolated constraint is not capable of causing an inci dent, nor an accident, but the accumulated demands placed on operators by many constantly present con straints may cause large losses.
Identification of the constraints to pilots' activities is per se an important step toward correcting and elim inating the recurring risk they represent, but safety of ficers and other professionals involved in the system must take note of these constraints and act so that in due course solutions can be developed to mitigate or extinguish them.
Roll o f constraints, exceptions, accommodations, and differences between activities as prescribed and as practiced
Below we present a list of constraints obtained from the transcription and analysis of the interviews, about which there is broad agreement among the personnel involved, and, when possible, illustrated by represen tative quotes from the interviews. 
PILOT S ' ACTIVITIES' CONSTRAINTS MAP

P h y s ic a l e n v i r o n m e n t
Local w eather
F l i g h t i n f r a s t r u c t u r e
Bird collision risk 
Budget constraints in flig h t operations (p ilo t income issues)
S o c i o e m o t i o n a i e n v i r o n m e n t
P ilo t/co-pilot relationship
Rapid changes in flig h t planning
Flight schedules
O p e r a t i o n s is s u e s Adverse weather conditions that hamper maneuvers, especially landing, are a factor that causes crews great stress. The region where the platforms are located is susceptible to high winds. Dense fog is often present, causing great loss of visibility. These weather con ditions are not easy to predict. Pilots gather weather reports before starting their flights, and communicate with radio operators and the three air traffic controllers stationed aboard rigs offshore, but these procedures are not sufficient to avoid unpleasant surprises such as coming across a region of dense fog while operating on information that visibility there is adequate. The lack of visibility may be such as to leave the pilot uncom fortable with the safety of his situation and cause him to abort the flight. When this happens, the pilot may be subject to even greater discomfort from appearing to be malingering.
Another serious concern is the formation of pockets of hot air near the landing sites. This is due to the pres ence of exhaust vents near the helipads. If an aircraft comes across one of these regions of instability and reduced support during its landing approach, it drops abruptly, forcing the pilot to deploy "over torque", a condition where the turbines are overloaded and which may lead to an accident.
Bird collision risk
"( ...) Seagulls are the biggest problem, because they're really stupid and will fly right at you, and won't keep away. Buzzards see a helicopter and quickly get away, but seagulls don't. They come for it, and if there's a collision it can be a serious problem ( . . . ) " "( ...) Yesterday a pilot died in Angra and it seems it was a bird that hit the pilot and wound up causing the accident. . . "
A bird strike is an important incident causing fac tor (see Fig. 2 ). Despite the growing efforts of govern mental and non-governmental organizations, the num ber of reported collisions has increased over the years. Improper land-use near airfields, for activities such as open garbage dumps, slaughterhouses, and fish land ing sites, attracts ever larger numbers of birds to their vicinity, which increases the risk of incidents.
Statistics indicate that over 80% of bird strikes occur during takeoff, approach, or landing maneuvers, which confirms that the presence of birds near airfields con stitutes a real threat to pilots and passengers.
There is a standard set by the National Environ ment Advisory Board for Airport Safety Areas, regions around the airfields where activities that attract birds are banned. These regions have 20 km radii in the case of IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) capable airfields and 13 km radii for airfields restricted to VFR (Visual Flight Rules).
Since it does mot provide for any sanctions or pun ishment for noncompliance, the Airport Safety Areas standard is often flouted, endangering the lives of air men. The regulatory process of this very important standard is under way, but, for the time being, activities that attract birds continue to go on in the intended Air port Safety Areas. Bird density near airfields should be considered a safety indicator, since it and flight risk are closely related.
The sanitation problems in the city of Macae, where several sites are used for open garbage dumps, create an attractive environment that promotes the presence of undesirable birds such as vultures and gulls. The mas sive presence of birds around the airport is a major risk factor for air activity in the area.
Collisions with these birds are frequent and their outcome can range from a good fright to irreparable helicopter damage or a forced landing. A bird collision with a helicopter windshield may break it and injure pilots and passengers. Birds can also be sucked into a turbine and damage it enough to force single-engine flight or a brusque maneuver with possible disastrous consequences.
Pilots report that because of the birds they are re quired to pay double attention and that over time they start to recognize the behavior differences between some species of birds.
Operating environment 3.2.2.1. Distance from hangar and offices to the helicopter
When there are no available spots in front of the company's hangar, the aircraft park at the far end of the airport, about a half mile away. The crew has to walk up to 8 minutes.
"( ...) It is almost one km from here to there, an almost 10 minute walk. When there is no space in front you park on the other side and you only have half an hour between flights. From there to here you've blown ten minutes. You get here and still need to attend to post-flight maintenance, check the fuel and other items, and go back there to open [the aircraft] for passengers, which takes 7-8 minutes, and all of it in the sun ( ...) " "( ...) But sometimes he (the pilot) sits there and tells us (the co-pilot) to walk over here, like a camel.. Pilots and passengers have no way to get around on the apron other than on foot. There are some small tractors and carts, but they are for the exclusive use of maintenance crews and transporting baggage. Macae airport is about one kilometer long, and none of the apron is sheltered from the sun. Due to the large num ber of aircraft in operation it is necessary that the whole apron area be used to park aircraft. It is not uncommon for a crew whose hanger is at one end of the field to be assigned to park their aircraft at the other end. Or be it, dressed as pilots, in uniform trousers and shirts, they walk up to about 15 minutes under the Rio de Janeiro summer sun [between flights].
There is no doubt this situation puts a lot of wear on the pilots. Wear that seems unnecessary, given the numerous alternative means of transport that could be deployed to spare them, a point they are keenly aware of. This constraint is closely related to the "short inter val between flights" constraint, and addressing it would address that one as well. It's so as to keep the weight down. Besides being a device that can malfunction, and ground the air craft. It will increase weight maybe about 30 kilos, but I think the main issue is maintenance as it can be one more source of problems ( ...) "
The aircraft are not air conditioned. Equipment cost has negligible impact on the initial cost of the air craft, but its weight reduces the load carrying capacity of the helicopter and it generates undesirable mainte nance. Pilots and co-pilots constantly mention the wear on them from working in high temperatures. Delays due to the intense air traffic at the airport force pilots to wait long periods for permission to start taxi and takeoff procedures, and temperatures regularly exceed 40°C inside the cabin while the aircraft is parked on the apron at Macae airport. In extreme cases the wait can reach 45 minutes.
Excessive vibration in the cockpit
"( ...) The beginning of a breakdown is almost al ways vibration. If the Captain keeps flying with above normal vibration, he will do harm to the whole helicopter and breakdowns will happen one after another. Even the organs of the human body are affected, because each of them works on a fre quency. And then one arrives [home] at night and goes to bed more weary than normal, and doesn't know why ( ...) "
This constraint is more prevalent in older aircraft. In the case of Macae, the older aircraft that generate pi lots' complaints are the Bell 212 and Bell 412 mod els. The quality of the flight is directly affected by their vibration. Passengers feel queasy, and the crew expe riences above normal fatigue. Pilots also mention the possibility that vibration can cause problems in other equipment, jeopardizing flight safety. Many pilots ad vocate the retirement and replacement of the Bell air craft by the more modern S-76A and S-76C + aircraft.
Economic environment 3.2.3.1. Budget constraints in maintenance operations
Conflicts among pilots, mechanics and inspectors were reported. If the Captain writes in the Aircraft Log Book that there is a problem in the aircraft, it is then necessary to ground it (Revenue/contract issues?) and perform the maintenance. Otherwise, the company
[a W W am w P M u rtS O f P e r t u n P ts ia fo r ira at Pwiu5»n Nsvlo Sontla I Ntvto ,1e Trarapono ou tadUgto ^ Jaqueia r«a A Porto Os Cortio* A ■ ' enwlo O NSo aMWM may be fined by the regulator. So sometimes pilots don't write equipment problems or malfunctions in the Aircraft Log, and report it informally -directly to a mechanic -(inconsistent) to keep flying under MEL (Minimum Equipment List) rules. This goes on until the pilot cannot stand it anymore and decides to report it officially. Besides Safety, there is also a conflict with mechanics.
"( ...) Sometimes we have to stop an aircraft to get some larger repair service done and the guys (mechanics) keep trying to patch over the problem.
( ...) they waste time and don't solve the problem. Until we say, OK, enough, now this really has to happen. We hammer a long time on something ev eryone knows about: pilots know, mechanics know, the administration knows that it's no use [patching] anymore, it has to be replaced." "( ...) But there are equipment failures that cause an aircraft no not comply with the MEL (Mini mum Equipment List) requirements, and the air craft should be made unavailable, grounded. That's why pilots sometimes don't record equipment mal functions immediately in the logbook. But there are breakdowns that maintenance doesn't repair due to the lack of replacement parts. So they go into patching mode and do something about the prob lem, but half an hour later, it goes bad again. About then pilot and co-pilot get stressed because the flights become dangerous. There comes a moment when the pilot gets fed up because they aren't do ing anything and records the issue in the aircraft's logbook, making the aircraft unavailable. There's an aircraft out there, XXX (prefix deleted), which has recurring problems, where it sometimes gives off a violent burning smell, returns to base, and mechanics find nothing ( ...) "
Like any business, air taxi companies (the helicopter operators) are always on the lookout for opportunities to reduce maintenance costs. The cost of maintaining helicopters of the size used in offshore passenger trans portation operations is huge. Besides the high price of the parts themselves, there are also the expenses of maintaining a crew of highly qualified maintenance and specialized professionals, among others. Addition ally there are extended maintenance downtimes due to parts unavailability on the domestic market. During its •1S1W . SBME/MENA 69NM/33min SBME/MEDI 63NM/30min. SBME/ANDO 52NM/25min SBME/ONIX 49NM/22min SBME/TAMA 45NM/20mln. K W -3 0 0 2 9 3 / 1 1 3 downtime an aircraft generates no revenue and if it ex ceeds contractual allowances on unavailability it will incur stiff penalties. It is worth noting that Petrobras' contracts for its passenger offshore air transportation services bind specific aircraft, which therefore cannot be interchanged even for another identical one.
Radio Marlim
Sometimes companies' withholding of maintenance department funds seems exaggerated. There are situa tions where due to a company instruction certain rou tine procedures cease to be performed. An extreme ex ample was provided during one of the interviews: a pi lot or co-pilot notices a little play on the joystick and communicates it to the aircraft mechanic upon return ing to the hangar; on his next flight he notices the play again and repeats the process, only to find out some time later that there is a company instruction stipulat ing that such errors should be ignored until the required replacement parts are on hand so as to avoid the aircraft be grounded while the parts are procured.
This drives a double constraint: the aircraft will op erate below optimum for longer than ideal, and pilots and mechanics will be at loggerheads because of the necessarily unclear communication where mechanics seem to accept a task but are in reality unauthorized to comply.
If the situation becomes extreme the pilot may wield his power to impose action by reporting the issue in the aircraft's log as mentioned earlier. Every aircraft has a logbook that is registered to it at the DAC (Civil Avi ation Department) and which is verified regularly. Be sides the routine entries made in the logbook, a pilot or co-pilot can describe a failure detected during his last flight. From that moment on the aircraft becomes unavailable for flight until the defect is corrected. Pi lots are well aware of the downside of resorting to a logbook entry to tip maintenance's hand: conflict with maintenance and possibly dissatisfied management.
The situations described above make clear that it is necessary to establish viable limits to control spend- Informagao e seguranga para todos ing on maintenance. One cannot lose sight of the idea that, in the case of offshore air transportation, this line is thin, and if poorly managed can lead to irreparable damage.
Budget constraints in flight operations (pilot income issues)
"(•..) There are pilots who neglect flight safety to be able to fly more ( ...) " "( ...) There are cases -with older machineswhere the pilot knows he should stop the aircraft due to excessive vibration, but doesn't and leaves the maintenance period for the other crew so as to earn more. This is bad because although he gets to fly a lot some fortnights, other fortnights another crew may do the same to him and he will spend the time waiting for the aircraft to be repaired ( ...) "
The companies studied adopt varying pay poli cies where some [significant] portion of pilots' and co-pilots' pay is variable and determined by hours flown. Under these policies each professional receives a salary composed of a fixed portion whose value varies according to job function, seniority etc., plus an amount linked to hours flown during the fortnight. The actual hourly rates vary between companies and be tween pilots and co-pilots. Considering pilots' hourly wages to be about twice those of co-pilots, and the vari able portion of co-pilots' pay to account for up to 40% of their total compensation excluding benefits are use ful approximations. This can be seen in the table be low. This policy aims motivate pilots and co-pilots to fly as much as possible during the fortnight they are in Macae.
In theory the effort of pilots and co-pilots to maxi mize their billable hours would not be harmful to the system as the system itself would work to define and restrict the number of hours possible. However, part of the system's feedback loops on the state of its equip ment depends on pilots and co-pilots providing this information. This creates a conflict, as pilots and co pilots are encouraged to fly as much as possible while being given the task of deciding when to make an air craft unavailable due to maintenance, and thereby take a pay hit.
The following hypothetical situation was provided by a co-pilot. A pilot and a copilot make the first flight of the fortnight and realize a there is a flaw in some sensor. Considering flight safety, the ideal measure to be taken would be to inform the maintenance depart ment and hand the aircraft over to them for mainte nance. However, this intervention may take the entire fortnight, leaving the pilot and co-pilot with very few billable hours and consequently less pay in the given month. Another option is to continue flying without re porting the troubled sensor, hoping it won't be needed, and then report it to maintenance near the end of the fortnight, leaving the next fortnight's crew to deal with the aircraft's unavailability. The decision to notify maintenance could lead to the loss of up to 40% of the month's pay, depending on the company in question and pilot pay-scale. The frac tion of co-pilots' compensation that varies due to ac tual hours flown can be as high as 30%.
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Socio-emotional environment 3.2.4.1. Pilot/co-pilot relationship
Airmen see themselves as belonging to different classes, among which there are relationship problems. There is rivalry between the civilian and military avi ators, and, among the latter, rivalry between the avia tors from different forces. These rivalries can become problems when they collide with the rank distinction between pilots and co-pilots (captain and crew, respec tively) in the Campos Basin helicopter offshore pas senger transportation service companies, where local experience and service time count more than overall experience or service time. Besides the class rivalries, there are personality issues between some of the avi ators. Some co-pilots report having relationship prob lems with certain captains. Many of the captains are aloof, unwilling to teach, and resentful of criticism and suggestions. There were reports of cases where there was no dialogue between pilot and co-pilot other than that required by flight procedures for the full fortnight of their tour together.
Intra-crew hostility is highly detrimental to safe fly ing, and there is at least one company working on this 
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11.886 lbs para 25 graus issue. As yet, the focus of their work is still toward un derstanding the phenomenon, rather than implement ing any practical measures. Although our access to their work on cabin hostility was restricted, it was clear from interviewing the psychologist responsible for the work that the company considers this area to have great potential to improve flight safety. Many of the people interviewed are aware of the CRM work going on at different levels and its impor tance. but are also frustrated with the persistence of problems.
FAVOR DEVOLVER ESTE PLANO DE VOO JUNTO COM ADOCUMENTAQAO
Operations issues 3.2.5.1. Flight schedules
The interval between successive flights of a same crew is only 30 minutes. During this time the crew must complete and file a post-flight report and perform a series of tasks to prepare for the next flight such as checking the weather forecast, preparation of a flight plan, giving refueling instructions. If we take into ac count the time needed for the crew to walk from the aircraft's parking position to their company's offices, it's possible to find there is not enough time for a quick break or a simple coffee. Even going to the bathroom can end up being done in a rush.
If we consider a day during which pilots have sev eral flights, the only rest interval is lunch time. This does not seem to be the ideal situation for an activity in which it's necessary to deal with constant stress and pressure.
Rapid changes in flight planning
Most of the pilots reported being surprised by scheduling plan changes during flight operation. These 11.886 lbs p a ra 25 graus changes are communicated by radio and have serious consequences on pilot's workload. Pilots' mental rep resentation must be changed in order to deal with these new tasks' cascades. "( ...) You get out of here with everything ready, all right, I go to such a place, caught many passengers, etc. Then on the way the radio reports a change in schedule. I usually walk away with everything just right, with flying around the head. I have to take off here, warning here, this radial. Changes when I get lost. Okay, now where do I go? What do 1 do? Changes all in your head. For me it greatly in creases the stress ( ...) "
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Lack of standardized identification of the production units
According to Brazilian Navy procedures the oil rig identification must be written in the helipad decks in stead to be on the rig sides that facilitates an identifi cation anticipation process. This change according to pilots will improve the operation safety in the region. "( ...) On this issue the landing, a big problem I see now is that there is proper identification. There is no standardization, it is sometimes very difficult to identify the ship or the correct platform ( . .. ) " "( ...) Have identification on the deck, but it had to be more visible and easier to identify. This is a big 
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B H e lic o p t e r o : P P -P P P C lie n t e : problem in small ships. In each ship stays in one place and that this identification leads to greater difficulty, you have to pay more attention ( ...) "
Ship operations
In the case of small ships, the natural difficulty of landing on platforms is redoubled. The helipads tend to be very high, making it so that even a light swell results in large amplitude displacements of the land ing site. Another problem is the natural position of the vessel in accordance with the ocean currents, which does not always mean the best position for helicopter Planning Report to fit the clipboards used aboard with only one fold approaches that depend on the wind. Sometimes, pi lots are required to request that the vessel be reposi tioned. As this is a time consuming maneuver, it is not always possible for the aircraft, flying with limited fuel reserves, to await its conclusion.
Many pilots suggested gathering the passengers to or from these small vessels on larger platforms nearby, and use sea transportation for the final leg.
Limited contingency fleet
In the Campos Basin there's no back up aircraft to rescue passengers at sea. There is consensus among the pilots of the importance of such an aircraft. In addition to the demand voiced by the air-crews for the existence of a rescue craft, the same demand has been voiced by the Union of Workers in the North Fluminense Oil Industry (RJ-Sindipetro). The rescue helicopter should be able to take-off and land on water, carry equipment suitable for rescuing people at sea, and have a crew of professionals trained for this purpose, and should be on standby during all hours of offshore flight operations.
To bolster their case for a rescue helicopter, pi lots recounted an incident where after a forced land ing in the sea, all passengers left the craft safely and were in lifeboats awaiting rescue. Helicopters flying in the vicinity could do nothing more than observe the downed passengers in the lifeboats and report their ex act position to air traffic control. By the time the rescue boat got the passengers ashore, 5 h 40 min had elapsed from the time of the crash landing.
Flight infrastructure 3.2.6.1. Congested radio communications
All the people interviewed complained about the ra dio system. Many of them have stories of incidents that happened because of miscommunications.
Near the oil rigs there are aircrafts trying to com municate with the platform's radio. At these mo ments when communication is crucial it becomes com- AM ENTO DE VOO VISUAL # 999999 plicated to communicate clearly. The solution often adopted by pilots to communicate to oil rig radio oper ator a new frequency they are changing to and to make the communication through this new one
Flight area map is inadequate
One of the issues cited by the vast majority of the respondents was the inadequacy of the Campos Basin regional maps provided by the operators. These maps don't use color, which makes it difficult to lo cate some important points, increasing pilots' cogni tive load. Moreover, the size of some information items is too small to be suitably legible for most pilots, a problem that is compounded in the case of some pilots who have hyperopia and/or presbyopia.
As an alternative to the company provided maps, many of the pilots who fly in the Campos Basin buy maps prepared by a fellow captain who also flies there. He updates them every fifteen days using mapping software donated by a consulting company that con ducted a study during the 90's in the region, and sells them for an almost symbolic price. This map, besides using color, presents its data in a more appropriate scale, including a larger scale detail box covering the part of the field more densely occupied by the various rigs and ships, significantly reducing pilots' cognitive loads.
Flight plan form is inadequate
Although flight planning is formally attributed to the captain, in practice this activity is shared with com pany officers and the co-pilot. The captain nonetheless retains ultimate responsibility for all aspects of flight planning. The data that determine the flight plan are the flight's legs (intermediate destinations) and loads (passenger and/or cargo weight), elements defined by the client company, as well as the aircraft's characteristics, and meteorological conditions. From these, flight times, fuel consumption, and extra fuel requirements are cal culated. All flights require an extra fuel provision to al low for unexpected events, and the size of this provi sion varies according to the rules governing the flight, whether visual or instrument flight rules (VFR or IFR), which in turn depend on weather conditions.
To support the feasibility of the turnaround time be tween flights, and make the pilots' task easier in gen eral, companies perform part of the flight planning work. One of the helicopter operating companies to which we had access provides crews with computer generated flight plans with their flight data filled in as well as pre-calculated time and fuel consumption es timates and passenger boarding/deboarding tallies in reports titled "Visual Flight Planning Report" or "In strument Flight Planning Report", depending on the weather conditions. Airmen recognize benefits in the computer gener ated Flight Planning Reports we analyzed, but are quick to point out several shortcomings, and to demon strate various strategies to get around those and meet their needs. It is possible that the report is being used for purposes beyond those of its initial design and this may explain the deficiencies pointed out by aviators, but regardless of the origin of the condition, it is clear that this artifact is inadequate for its current use. We have not had access to the development team that pro duced the artifact and we have no information about the scope of the original flight planning report project.
Several helicopter operating companies have not participated in this study yet, and there may be better practices and artifacts in use in some of them, but there is a consensus among the pilots interviewed that the company procedure shown here as an example is the most advanced.
Briefly, the prescribed process consists of the car rier passing the initial flight specification information to the crew, who then obtain any necessary additional data and generate operational data to put together a flight plan (sometimes two) to file with the AIS (Air port Information Service) and to use during flight op- eration. The flight plan used during flight operation is also where any relevant events are generally recorded. In the case of the sample report presented here, in addition to the flight specification information pro vided, there is a recommendation of flight rules to adopt in light of the current weather conditions and an initial fuel requirement estimate. The information layout is more appropriate for an administrative than an operational report, and the existence of a notice warning that the report and its planning are experimen tal and should not be used as an official flight plan was pointed out by the respondents. Pilots question the maintenance of this warning and the reports' experi mental status for over a year, and point out that the captain is responsible for all aspects of a flight, regard less of whether there is a written warning or not. They also complain of the report's poor use of the available space. They are quick to point out that the block of lines that provide detailed passenger loading and un loading information at each stop, which they refer to as up-and-down, seems to have been an afterthought. The amount of data that may be present in this re port, which may reflect flights with up to 16 legs, and which merges data needed at different stages of the flight planning and execution process, imposes the use of small text and A4 paper. The use of small font sizes is a problem as it makes reading the text difficult for pilots with presbyopia, an as yet unquantified but nonetheless significant group. The A4 paper size is a problem because it is twice the size of the clipboard available in the cockpit and there fore makes it so that parts of the report are not readily accessible in flight. As the report layout does not group the information needed in flight in a small enough area, simply folding the report does not solve the problem. While some pilots resort to transcribing information from one area to another on the sheet so as to enable a single fold, others prefer to use multiple folds to make the report fit the small format (a complex procedure they jokingly refer to as origami), and others are con tent to keep flipping the sheet over during the flight. A single pilot may adopt any one of the various strate-gies to fit the report to inflight constraints depending on the number of legs and/or flight time. This lay-out issue becomes ever more critical as the number of legs on a flight increases. This is so because the data, ac tivity and the complexity of the activity increase with the number of legs, while the time to deal with them decreases, making the lack of space even more present.
In the following pages we present the Flight Plan ning report (Fig. 8) and show how pilots prepare it to better suit the requirements of inflight use. Figure 9 il lustrates the process they call 'origami', and Fig. 10 the process of transcription. As noted earlier, there are pilots who use the report as is or just folded in half (not represented here). We have also highlighted in the illustrations the information necessary calculate fuel requirements, to carry out flight operations, and for administrative use. Lastly we present these three de mands simultaneously, which clarifies the apparent ad vantage of adding all elements in a sheet.
Due to the constraints to which pilots are subjected during flight, especially lack of space, lack of time, and moments of intense activity, the report's disadvan tages, namely its physical size, the use of small fonts, poor information distribution, and the presence of in formation not used in flight, exceed, by far, any advan tage to serve various purposes with a single report.
It is interesting to note that although the limited space available in flight evidently is a constraint, it does not figure among the constraints identified through the interviews. This is due to the fact that it is accepted by the pilots as a premise, which they label as a restriction, but they do not mention it in the sense of something that bothers them.
Separating the functional components of the Flight Planning Report into two or three separate reports, one for flight operation, and the other(s) for flight planning and administrative needs, can result in reports better suited to their use by reducing the total volume of in formation in each report and thereby allowing that in formation to be better laid-out according to the dynam ics of its use.
With this in mind, we developed two alternative pre liminary layout proposals for a Flight Plan geared for use while operating the flight. Both layouts have an A5 form factor. The biggest difference between the two layouts is the allocation of one (Figs 17 and 18) 
Conclusions
We describe how the ergonomics methodologies can be used to uncover constraints of a complex system, the Campos Basin helicopter transportation system, and provide useful insights about system safety and re silience. Although the safety record of the personnel transportation system studied is considered acceptable, our research showed that there is low hanging fruit to be picked which can help improve the system's safety. The constraints uncovered reveal that the system per formance and behaviors did not facilitate the develop ment of buffer capacities throughout the system that fa cilitate people's work and decisions. Our analysis does not aim the produce a complete set of recommenda tions to improve the system, as the official accident re ports try to do. Our aim was to shed some light about how the Campos Basin helicopter transportation sys tem is actually functioning, because for a system to be controllable, it is necessary to know what goes on inside it and the ergonomic methodology provide a sufficient clear description of the system. We do be lieve that without a clear description of the system con straints, if we do not known what really happens in side it, then it is clear impossible to control it effec tively, as well as to provide meaningful recommenda tions about specific points or systems functions to im prove the safety. To implement specific recommenda tions about the need to review and/or to follow rules and procedures, to provide more training, supervision and so forth, as indicated by accident investigations, without understanding the real nature of system oper ation, will not produce the desired outcomes, because underlying behaviors will be soon drifted again to pro duce new unwanted outcomes.
